- Discussion:
-Some argue that if God reveals truth, the church must be able to teach without error. But that leap is not as simple as it might seem. This article breaks down the assumptions behind that claim:
“The claim to infallibility, while a bold one, is actually quite sensible in its own way.”
Calling the claim “sensible” is rhetorical framing, not argument. Infallibility is an extraordinary assertion: that a human institution can, under certain conditions, teach without the possibility of error. That is not self‑evidently sensible; it is precisely what needs justification. The sentence softens the reader before presenting the real claim, but it does not defend the claim itself.
“It is virtually a tautology, in fact, since it amounts to saying nothing more than this: if God has revealed himself, then what he has revealed is true, and the Church can come to know over time in a definitive way what God has revealed.”
This is not a tautology. The first clause (“if God has revealed himself, then what he has revealed is true”) is tautological. The second clause (“the Church can come to know…in a definitive way”) is an additional, highly contested claim. You can affirm divine revelation without granting that a particular institution has an infallible interpretive mechanism. The conclusion is smuggled in as if it were contained in the premise, but it is not.
“These are not in themselves very astonishing claims.”
“These are not in themselves very astonishing claims.”
They are astonishing. The idea that a specific hierarchical body can issue error‑free doctrinal statements binding on all believers is a monumental claim. Minimizing its magnitude does not make it less controversial. The sentence functions to normalize something that is, historically and philosophically, anything but normal.
“They rest on a more fundamental claim, namely that God has revealed himself.”
“They rest on a more fundamental claim, namely that God has revealed himself.”
They rest on two fundamental claims: that God has revealed himself, and that God has guaranteed that this particular church can infallibly identify that revelation. The second does not follow from the first. Many religious traditions affirm divine revelation without attributing infallibility to any institution. The argument conflates revelation with a specific ecclesiology.
“But if that has occurred, why would it be so strange that God should assist the Church over time, in and through controversy and dispute, and despite the terrible moral and intellectual limitations of her adherents, to come to know the truth he has revealed?”
“But if that has occurred, why would it be so strange that God should assist the Church over time, in and through controversy and dispute, and despite the terrible moral and intellectual limitations of her adherents, to come to know the truth he has revealed?”
“Assist” is ambiguous and does not imply infallibility. Assistance could mean guidance, inspiration, correction, or providential care, none of which require a guarantee of error‑free teaching. The argument slides from “God helps” to “God prevents error,” which is a leap. It also assumes that “the Church” refers specifically to the Roman Catholic magisterium, which is precisely the point under dispute.
“What would be stranger, indeed illogical in its own right, would be the claim that God has revealed himself, most certainly, but that we might just as certainly deny the Church’s capacity to identify his teaching with certitude.”
“What would be stranger, indeed illogical in its own right, would be the claim that God has revealed himself, most certainly, but that we might just as certainly deny the Church’s capacity to identify his teaching with certitude.”
This confuses the certainty of divine truth with the certainty of human interpretation. It is not illogical to say that God’s revelation is certain while our grasp of it is limited or fallible. Human fallibility does not undermine divine truth. It simply acknowledges our limitations. The argument also presumes a single, unified interpretive authority is necessary, which is historically and theologically doubtful.
“If the Church cannot teach infallibly, then we are in fact required to say something absurd of just this kind: God has revealed himself, but the Church can never say with assurance what God has revealed.”
“If the Church cannot teach infallibly, then we are in fact required to say something absurd of just this kind: God has revealed himself, but the Church can never say with assurance what God has revealed.”
This is a false dilemma. It assumes that without infallibility, there can be no meaningful assurance at all. But human knowledge routinely operates with high confidence without requiring infallibility, in science, ethics, history, and daily life. Fallible but reliable knowledge is not absurd. It is the human condition. The argument artificially restricts the options to force the conclusion.
“In that case we might claim that there is an infallibly true revelation of God, but we must also admit that we cannot identify it, practically speaking, in any realistic way.”
This overstates the consequences of rejecting infallibility. Not being able to identify revelation infallibly does not mean that we cannot identify it at all. Traditions, consensus, reason, experience, and communal discernment can yield substantial, meaningful understanding without requiring a guarantee of zero error. Even within Catholicism, doctrinal development, internal disagreement, and non‑definitive teachings show that practical certainty is not as absolute as this sentence suggests.
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